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ABSTRACT. This Feature examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that harm sellers. We
separately consider two mechanisms of harm, increased classical monopsony power and increased
bargaining leverage. We show that lost upstream competition is an actionable harm to the com-
petitive process. Our central claim is that harm to sellers in an input market is sufficient to support
antitrust liability. We defend this conclusion against the contrary view that demonstrated harm to
the merging firms' downstream purchasers or final consumers is an essential element of any anti-
trust claim. Nor is it necessary for plaintiffs to demonstrate a reduction in the input quantity trans-
acted. We further argue that claimed "efficiencies" premised on a reduction in buy-side competi-
tion are not efficiencies at all.
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INTRODUCTION
In the typical merger case considered by antitrust law, the main concern is
that the merging parties-two airlines, say-will be able to raise the prices they
charge purchasers. Some mergers, however, reduce competition among compet-
ing buyers, thereby reducing the prices that sellers receive for their products and
services. These adverse "buy-side" effects may harm a wide variety of sellers, in-
cluding workers selling labor, farmers selling agricultural commodities, and
video content producers selling sports programming. For example, a merger of
Tyson Foods and Hillshire Farms could enable the merged company to reduce
the prices paid to pig farmers for animals used to make sausage.1
This Feature examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that harm sellers.
Our central claim is that harm to sellers in an input market is sufficient to sup-
port antitrust liability. We show how economic reasoning and case law support
the conclusion that lost upstream competition is an actionable harm to the com-
petitive process, and we defend this conclusion against the contrary view that
demonstrated harm to the merging firms' downstream purchasers or final con-
sumers constitutes an essential element of any antitrust claim. Nor is it necessary
for plaintiffs to demonstrate a reduction in the input quantity transacted, con-
trary to the mistaken view that such a reduction must be shown. We further
argue that claimed "efficiencies" premised on a reduction in buy-side competi-
tion are not efficiencies at all. We focus on mergers, but much of our argument
applies to conduct cases as well.
Some mergers of competing buyers harm sellers by increasing the merged
firm's incentive to cut back on its purchases of an important input in order to
drive down input prices - a classical exercise of monopsony power.2 A buyer that
faces small, interchangeable sellers - for example, a hospital in a small city hiring
skilled nurses -has monopsony power that is analogous to a seller's monopoly
power. A merger of competing buyers can exacerbate the merged firm's incentive
to buy less in order to drive down input prices. Increased monopsony power can
have adverse conomic effects not only in input markets, but output markets as
well.
We argue that although an output market impact is sufficient to support lia-
bility, it is not necessary. Courts have recognized antitrust liability even where a
1. See Complaint at 3, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 14-cv-1474, 2014 WE 4249929
(D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2014) (alleging that the acquisition of a competing buyer would harm com-
petition in the market for "purchase of sows from farmers").
2. As explained further in Section I.A, we use this term to denote what economists would recog-
nize as classical monopsony, in which the buyer chooses an input quantity along a supply
curve and the exercise of market power reduces input prices by restricting purchases.
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competitive output market suffers no adverse effects.' This result is consistent
with (and reliant upon) the economically symmetric effects of monopoly in out-
put markets and monopsony in input markets. The symmetric treatment of mo-
nopoly and monopsony in antitrust law protects the competitive process and the
welfare of the merging firms' trading partners, whether purchasers or sellers.'
Reduced competition between buyers may well harm downstream purchasers,
even where that harm is infeasible to prove, but that reduced competition is un-
lawful even where in fact there is no such harm.
To be sure, courts and commentators often refer to the protection of "con-
sumer welfare," rather than trading partner welfare, as the goal of antitrust law.
As we explain, such references are consistent with a trading partner welfare ap-
proach, the natural result of living in a world where most cases focus on reduced
competition between sellers. Whatever the label applied, an approach focused
solely on the welfare of downstream purchasers or final consumers is incon-
sistent with the case law. We therefore disagree with commentators who would
confine antitrust enforcement to conduct with demonstrated output market
harms.'
Mergers of competing buyers harm sellers alternatively, or in addition, by
increasing the new firm's bargaining leverage. The analysis of buy-side harms has
been focused largely on classical monopsony, with relatively little attention given
to bargaining leverage.6 Though sometimes ignored or lumped together with
3. See infra Section I.B (discussing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
549 U.S. 312 (2007); and Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948)).
4. See, e.g., The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated, or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Consumer Prot. and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (opening statement of Carl Shapiro, Professor of Busi-
ness Strategy, University of California, Berkeley), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/12-13-17%2oShapiro%2oTestimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/G8B5-4ET6] (stating
that the relevant harm arises when the competitive process is disrupted, thereby "harm [ing]
trading parties on the other side of the market") [hereinafter Shapiro Testimony]; Gregory J.
Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J.
707, 735 (2007) (discussing the Sherman Act's role in protecting trading partner welfare);
Marius Schwartz, Professor of Economics, Georgetown University, Should Antitrust Assess
Buyer Market Power Differently than Seller Market Power?, Comments at the DOJ/FTC
Workshop on Merger Enforcement 1, 4 (Feb. 17, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/atr/legacy/2o07/o8/3o/2o2607.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ELL-WPTV].
5. See infra Section I.B (discussing and criticizing the view that antitrust law protects purchasers
or final consumers, but not sellers).
6. See, e.g., ROGER D. BIAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (rev.
ed. 2010); Cf PETER C. CARSTENSEN, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER
POwER: A GLOBAL ISSUE 13 (2017) (" [M]uch of the exploitation resulting from buyer power
was and still is ignored."). By bargaining leverage, we mean the exercise of market power
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the exercise of classical monopsony power by litigants and courts, bargaining
leverage should be analyzed separately, given its distinct economic effects.
When buyers and sellers each have some market power-for example, a
health insurer facing a hospital-prices may be set through a negotiation pro-
cess. As we explain, economists have developed a rich theoretical and empirical
literature to describe this bargaining process and the determinants of its out-
comes.7 These models suggest that the agreed upon price is a function, in part,
of each side's ability to inflict an unattractive "outside option" on the other if
bargaining breaks down. A horizontal merger enables the merging parties to in-
flict a worse outside option - that is the source of the increased leverage - and
thus alter the prices paid. Here, the principal effect of reduced competition may
be a wealth transfer, with no necessary immediate effect on quantity transacted.
Courts have found that a merger of sellers that enables such a transfer by
reducing competition -for example, a merger of two hospitals that worsens an
insurer's outside option-is unlawful.8 A symmetric injury to the competitive
process can arise on the buy side -for example, a merger of two insurers that
worsens a hospital's outside option and thereby reduces the price paid. We con-
clude that such a bargaining-based harm suffered by a hospital or other input
provider is equally actionable. We therefore disagree with the position adopted
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in several matters, and endorsed by
some commentators, that buy-side harms are actionable only if there is a demon-
strated reduction in the quantity transacted.'
Lower input prices- including lower input prices achieved through in-
creased classical monopsony power or bargaining leverage -can benefit those
who purchase from the merged parties if the savings are passed through to pur-
chasers. We therefore consider to what extent lower input prices may offer a cog-
nizable defense to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. For example, an increase
in buyer size may result in real resource savings, flowing from lower costs to
supply the buyer with certain inputs. The upstream seller may then reduce the
price a buyer pays, without any change in buyer leverage or monopsony power.
Input price reductions from a merger that reflect real resource savings present a
through price negotiations that may use the threat of reduced purchases to lower input prices
without necessarily reducing the actual quantity purchased.
7. See infra Section II.A (discussing the bargaining literature).
8. See infra Section II.A (discussing ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559 (6th
Cit. 2014), and other cases).
9. See infra Section II.B. As discussed therein, the FTC's position conflicts with its own enforce-
ment actions against sell-side mergers that increase bargaining leverage, as well as the posi-
tion taken by the DOJ. Jonathan Sallet has noted this conflict in his recent analysis of the role
of buyer power and applicable legal standards in the context of horizontal mergers. Jonathan
Sallet, Buyer Power in Recent Merger Reviews, ANTITRUST, Fall 2017, at 82.
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potential source of efficiencies that counteract the upward pricing pressure in
output markets.
By contrast, savings achieved through the exercise of increased classical mo-
nopsony power or bargaining leverage are premised on a reduction in competi-
tion. Under existing law developed mainly in the analysis of output markets,
such "benefits" are not cognizable efficiencies. Such a savings does not count as
an antitrust benefit, even if it is passed through to downstream purchasers.
This Feature proceeds in three parts. Part I considers mergers that increase
classical monopsony power, concluding that an output market harm is sufficient
but not necessary to support antitrust liability. Part II turns to mergers that in-
crease bargaining leverage, arguing that a bargaining-based harm suffered by an
upstream seller is actionable, just like a bargaining-based harm suffered by a
downstream purchaser. Part III addresses whether and when lower input prices
offer a cognizable defense to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. There we ex-
plain why lower input prices caused by increased classical monopsony power or
bargaining leverage are not a cognizable basis for an efficiency claim.
I. INCREASED CLASSICAL MONOPSONY POWER
A. Input Market Harms
Monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly. The term "monopsony" is
sometimes used to refer to a wide range of harms that result from a powerful
buyer or a reduction in competition among buyers. We use the term here in its
narrower, classical sense - namely, to identify situations in which a firm recog-
nizes that its purchase decisions can change the market price for inputs. o
As an initial point of reference, consider a simple monopoly story. The firm
has market power in an output market. That is, it recognizes that its decisions
affect the selling price. If the firm raises price, its quantity sold falls, but not to
zero. Purchasers with high enough willingness to pay still buy the product, while
purchasers with lower willingness to pay drop out. By raising the price, the firm
10. The term "monopsony" was coined by Joan Robinson to denote a market with a single buyer.
See JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 215 (1932). We use mo-
nopsony power in that spirit, to include markets with one or a few large buyers, similar to the
use of monopoly power in antitrust. This is a narrower construct han often applied in the
field of labor economics, for example, where "monopsony" may attach to any deviation from
perfectly competitive conditions in labor markets -including search frictions, information
asymmetry, and worker immobility -whether related to the number of firms or not. See, e.g.,
Labor Market Monopsony: Trends, Consequences, and Policy Responses, COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS
(Oct. 2016), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/2ol61o25
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charges a higher price on all units, which raises overall profits as long as the in-
creased margin on retained sales more than compensates for the profit lost on
the sales no longer made. Part of the purchaser loss takes the form of revenue
transferred to the firm as extra profit. Additional loss takes the form of
"deadweight loss," wherein some purchasers who value the good more than its
marginal cost of production are deflected instead to less desirable alternatives.
Now consider monopsony. The firm has market power in an input market,
such as the labor it hires to make a product. The firm recognizes that its decisions
affect the purchase price of the input. If the firm reduces the price it pays, the
quantity available for purchase falls, but not to zero. In the labor context, workers
with a low enough reservation wage still accept a job offer; workers with a higher
reservation wage drop out. By reducing its wage offer, the firm pays a lower wage
for all employees, which can raise its overall profits.
Part of the workers' loss takes the form of wages transferred to the firm as
extra profit. Additional deadweight loss arises as workers whose greatest produc-
tivity is working for the firm are instead pushed to less productive employment
or out of the labor market entirely." The exercise of monopsony power in hiring
skilled labor, such as nurses, may lead to further economic losses over time, as
some workers choose not to invest in skill acquisition due to the lower wage
rate. 12 When the inputs are produced by upstream firms, such as farmers raising
beef cattle to be sold to meat processing companies, the further dynamic costs of
monopsony may include reductions in investment by upstream firms in capacity,
innovation, product quality, or other important input attributes. " While dy-
namic effects such as these will depend on the particular facts and circumstances
of a given market, and likely are difficult to quantify empirically, innovation costs
of reduced competition among buyers have the potential to dwarf static or short-
run costs.14
Underlying these effects is the important assumption that a buyer faces at-
omistic and interchangeable sellers. Under these conditions, there is a competi-
tive supply curve, yielding a single market-clearing price for a given quantity of
an input. If that supply curve is upward sloping -higher input prices call forth
more of that input, while lower input prices reduce the quantity supplied- buy-
ers with market power recognize that if they purchase more, they pay not only
the higher market clearing price for those incremental units, but higher prices
ii. For a detailed treatment of monopsony, see BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 41-45; B.
DOUGLAS BERNHEIM &MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, MICROECONOMICs 610-14 (rev. ed. 2014).
12. See, e.g., RogerG. Noll, "Buyer Power" and EconomicPolicy, 72ANTITRUSTL.J. 589, 601 (2005).
13. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MONOPSONY AND
BUYER POWER 53-54 (2009) [hereinafter OECD Report] (summarizing economic models in
which reduced compensation to sellers can lower the incentive to invest).
14. See Noll, supra note 12.
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on all the previously purchased units. The marginal cost of hiring additional la-
bor is not only the compensation paid to the additional workers, but also addi-
tional payments to all the other workers at the resulting higher market wage."
Thus, even as a labor market monopsonist pushes the market wage down, it
perceives a marginal cost of labor that is higher than that wage.
Monopsony is a frequent concern in labor and agricultural markets. A typical
example is a company town located next to an isolated coal mine.16 The mine
sets a low wage without worrying, at least in the short run, about losing too
many employees. Another classic example is the only grain elevator or chicken
processor for many miles around. Of course, in practice, degrees of market
power exist, just as with market power in output markets. We use the term "mo-
nopsony" to encompass the full range, including settings with multiple buyers
(so-called oligopsony).
As with lawfully acquired monopoly power, antitrust law does not prohibit
the exercise of lawfully acquired monopsony power, despite its economic costs.
Yet antitrust problems do arise when buyers increase their monopsony power by
combining forces. Agreements by competing buyers, especially of labor, have at-
tracted enforcement attention. For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has challenged a hospital association's coordinated purchase of so-called "per
diem" nursing services, " as well as agreements between leading technology
firms not to "poach" each other's employees, resulting in orders prohibiting both
practices. " In 2016, the DOJ and the FTC announced an intention to criminally
investigate employer agreements not to hire each other's employees or to fix
15. See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 11, at 611. In other input markets, sellers are not
"anonymous,' and prices for their inputs are instead set through a process that recognizes
their particular value of transacting with the buyer. If sellers are small or atomistic, this may
take the form of price discrimination in which buyers implicitly or explicitly group sellers into
categories. Group-specific prices may each be set through a monopsony process, like that de-
scribed above. These often are described as posted price processes, and the analysis is similar.
16. See, e.g., Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., Labor Market Monopsony, 28 J. LABOR ECON. 203, 204
(2010); CEA Report, supra note lo, at 3.
17. Final Judgment, United States v. Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Ass'n, 2007-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 75,869, 2007 WL 9431423 (D. Ariz. 2007) (describing DOJ's allegation that collusive
conduct reduced competition in the market for "hospitals' purchases of per diem nursing ser-
vices").
18. Final Judgment, United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., No. lo-cv-ol629 (D.D.C. Mar. 18,
2011); United States v. Lucasfilm, Inc., No. 10-02220, 2011 WL 2636850 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011)
(order approving proposed final judgment). See also Competitive Impact Statement at 3-8,
United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 18-cv-oo747 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (describing alleged
no-poaching agreements between leading suppliers of specialized rail equipment).
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wages or terms of employment." Outside the realm of government enforce-
ment, private cases have challenged no-poach deals and other horizontal agree-
ments to suppress upstream wages.2 0 A notable example is the series of cases
challenging NCAA rules that place a ceiling on the wages of coaches2 1 and stu-
dent-athletes.22 The DOJ, FTC, and private plaintiffs also have challenged buy-
side cartels in agricultural markets.23
The DOJ also has challenged mergers that threatened to increase monopsony
power, frequently among competing buyers of agricultural products including
ig. See Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC (Oct.
2016), http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download [http://perma.cc/UH2J-KXXY].
This guidance was reaffirmed in 2017. Acting Assistant Attorney General Andrew Finch Delivers
Remarks at Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 12, 2017),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch
-delivers-remarks-global-antitrust [http://perma.cc/9V33-YZD8].
20. See Amended Complaint, In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-cv-2509 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 13, 2011).
21. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d lolo, 1024 (loth Cit. 1998) (condemning an NCAA rule that placed
a limit on basketball coach earnings).
22. The rules capped scholarships at a level several thousand dollars below the full cost of attend-
ance and prohibited additional cash compensation. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054
( 9 th Cit. 2015). Reflecting the unusual facts of the case, a swap of the university's services for
the student's labor, the district court understood the case alternatively as a conspiracy to sell
educational services at a high price (an ordinary monopoly story) and as a conspiracy to pur-
chase student labor at a low price (a monopsony story). Id. at 1057-58.
23. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (chal-
lenging a cartel of sugar beet buyers); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979
( 9 th Cir. 2000) (challenging a cartel of milk buyers under state law in accordance with Sher-
man Act principles); Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 427 (7 th Cit. 1965)
(challenging a cartel of durum wheat buyers); Indictment, United States v. Wilmot, No.
9 7CR213 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 1997) (challenging bid-rigging in the procurement of cattle).
Agency enforcement against buy-side cartels extends to bid-rigging that is not well described
as an exercise of classical monopsony power. See, e.g., OECD Report, supra note 13, at 247
(submission of United States) (describing extensive criminal prosecutions against buyer car-
tels, particularly as to real estate foreclosure auctions); John Asker,A Study of the Internal Or-
ganization of a Bidding Cartel, loo AM. ECON. REv. 724 (2010) (describing a bidding ring of
stamp dealers).
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beef buyers,2 4 pig buyers,25 organic milk buyers,26 chicken processors,2 7 grain
traders,2 8 and rice millers.29 Beyond agricultural markets, the DOJ has chal-
lenged health insurer mergers on the ground that they would, among other ef-
fects, suppress the amount paid to physicians and other health care providers.o
In merger analysis of downstream impact, agencies rarely are concerned with
either monopoly or perfectly competitive downstream markets. Similarly, mo-
nopsony concerns are most likely to arise when a merger combines rival purchas-
ers in a concentrated input market. The reduction in competition from amerger
between two product market competitors can create upward pricing pressure in
the product market, by enabling each firm to recapture profits from the sales lost
to its merger partner when it raises its own product price." In a mirror image, a
merger between two input market competitors can manifest its competitive harm
through downward pricing pressure on input prices.32
24. Amended Complaint at4, United States v. JBS S.A., No. o8-CV-5992 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7,2008)
(alleging that the acquisition of a competing beef packer would harm competition in the mar-
ket for "purchase [of] fed cattle").
25. Complaint at 3, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 14-cv-1474, 2014 WAL 4249929 (D.D.C.
Aug. 27, 2014) (alleging that the acquisition of a competing buyer would harm competition in
the market for "purchase of sows from farmers"; case was later settled).
26. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Danone S.A., 2017-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
80,053, 2017 WL 3172888, at 6-7 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2017) (describing a DOJ allegation that the
acquisition of a raw organic milk processor would reduce competition in, inter alia, "the pur-
chase of raw organic milk from farmers" in the northeast United States).
27. Complaint at 7, United States v. George's Foods, LLC, No. 11CVooo43 (W.D. Va. May lo,
2011), 2011 WL 2445076 (alleging that the acquisition of a competing chicken processor would
harm competition in the market for "purchase of broiler grower services"; the case settled).
28. United States v. Cargill, Inc., No. 99CVol87 5, 2000 WL 1475752, at *1 (D.D.C. June 30, 2000)
(granting final judgment in the settlement of a DOJ suit alleging that the acquisition of a
competing grain trader would harm competition in "grain purchasing services").
29. United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n of Cal., No. S-84-lo66, 1986 WL 12562, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
1986) (agreeing with DOJ's allegation that acquisition of a competing rice miller would harm
competition in the market for "purchase or other acquisition for milling of paddy rice grown
in California").
30. Revised Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Aetna Inc., No. 3-99CV1398-H,
1999 WL 1419046, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999) (describing DOJ's allegation that "Aetna's
acquisition of Prudential will also consolidate its purchasing power over physicians' services
in Houston and Dallas, enabling the merged entity to unduly reduce the rates paid for those
services").
31. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic
Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. OF THEORETICAL ECON., Article 9 (2010) (defining and
discussing upward pricing pressure).
32. In addition to these unilateral effects between close substitute buyers, in principle there may
be coordinated effects as well. See, e.g., Antitrust Div., Statement of the Department of justice's
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The parties to a merger or agreement that increases monopsony power are
often also competitors in output markets. This is not a necessary condition; a
merger between a mine and a sawmill -or a wage suppressive agreement be-
tween Pixar and Apple" - can harm competition in the hiring of employees
without affecting output market competition. But where the merging firms also
compete in product markets, lost competition downstream poses a second com-
petitive threat.34 In such cases, an antitrust challenge usually focuses on the loss
of competition in output markets, and the claim of lost buy-side competition
may never be raised or adjudicated." These litigation decisions by parties and
courts have resulted in a dearth of buy-side case law, despite the frequent pres-
ence of upstream harm.
B. Output Market Harms: Sufficient, But Not Necessary
Output markets are relevant to increased monopsony power in a second, en-
tirely distinct way. The effects of increased monopsony power may be felt in out-
put markets. When a monopsonist reduces input purchases, it generally makes
further adjustments, such as increasing its purchase of other inputs (e.g., sub-
stituting machinery for labor) and reducing the quantity or quality of its output
(e.g., less coal from the mine, or lower patient staffing ratios at hospitals). If the
firm also has market power in the output market, the reduced output has an
additional adverse effect. The cutback in output raises product prices and pro-
duces additional deadweight loss.36
As long as there is an adverse effect in an output market, condemnation as a
violation of antitrust law is straightforward. The harder question arises if the
adverse effects of increased monopsony power appear to be observed entirely in
input markets. Some cases turn on this point. For example, if the firm sells in a
Antitrust Division on Its Decision To Close Its Investigation ofPerdue'sAcquisition of Coleman Nat-
ural Foods, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 2, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement
-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-its-decision-close-its-investigation-perdue [http://
perma.cc/25FV-GN4A] [hereinafter DOJ Perdue Closing Statement] (noting the potential
threat of increased coordination in the purchase of inputs, but concluding that the transaction
at issue did not pose this harm).
33. See Complaint at4, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. lo-cv-o1629 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010)
(alleging an agreement between Apple and Pixar not to recruit each other's employees through
cold calls).
34. In buy-side agreement cases, the agreeing firms may well be competitors in output markets,
but the agreement ypically does not regulate outputs (though, as discussed below, there
might be an effect on output markets).
35. See CARSTENSEN, supra note 6, at 141 (noting the relative lack of attention to buy-side issues).
36. There is a seldom discussed symmetric effect with monopoly. When a monopolist reduces
output, it cuts back on inputs, which may have a harmful effect in input markets.
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highly competitive product market, its cutback in output may not appear to raise
downstream prices, and the economic harm may seem isolated to sellers and to
allocative efficiency losses in the upstream market.7 However, numerous cases
are premised on input market effects alone," particularly when output market
harms may be comparatively difficult to measure or demonstrate. Nor is the
question limited to monopsony. In the bargaining leverage context discussed in
Part II, immediate harm to the output market may be attenuated or absent. A
further reason to care about identifying input-side harms is that if they are ac-
tionable harms, then, as discussed below, they are removed from consideration
as sources of efficiency.3 9
If antitrust serves only the welfare of downstream purchasers or final con-
sumers, as some commentators uggest,4 0 then a case challenging increased mo-
nopsony power with effects observed only in input markets would not be sus-
tained. However, the Supreme Court has taken a different view. Several cases
recognize that anticompetitive conduct that affects only input markets violates
antitrust law. For example, in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., the Court considered a buyer cartel, stating that " [i] t is clear that the
agreement is the sort of combination condemned by the Act, even though the
price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons specially injured under the treble
37. Another example arises where the monopsonized input is a component of the firm's fixed
costs, and therefore does not affect its output decision. For an argument that effects are un-
likely to be confined to the monopsonized input market, however, see Noll, supra note 12, at
599-6oo & nn.24-25 ("When lower-productivity suppliers displace higher-productivity sup-
pliers [due to monopsony restriction of input purchases], more resources are used to produce
the final good than would have been used in the absence of monopsony. If these additional
resources have productive use anywhere else in the economy, the net result of the monopsony
is to raise the real price of the final product and to reduce the value of total output to consum-
ers."). Monopsony also may reduce welfare by worsening input quality. See id. at 601 (dis-
cussing a health care monopsony: " [I]f physicians must make continuing investments in hu-
man capital to keep their skills current, monopsony will reduce their incentive to do so and,
as a result, quality-adjusted supply will decline.").
38. See, for example, the Cargill and George's Foods cases cited supra, and the Weyerhaeuser case
discussed infra. See also DOJ Perdue Closing Statement, supra note 32 (discussing DOJ inves-
tigation of combination of chicken processors, limited to effect on input markets); Marius
Schwartz, Econ. Dir. of Enf't, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Buyer Power Concerns and
the Aetna-Prudential Merger, Address at Fifth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, 7-8 (Oct.
20, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/buyer-power-concerns-and-aetna-prudential
-merger [http://perma.cc/5NFG-9TEY] (discussing the absence of an output harm allega-
tion in Cargill, given that output price for grain is "determined in world markets"). However,
as discussed supra note 37 and accompanying text, even in such cases the general equilibrium
effect involves some output market harm, albeit one that may be difficult to measure.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard?
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loy. CONSUMERL. REV. 336 (2010).
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damage claim are sellers, not customers or consumers."4 1 As the Tenth Circuit
has recognized, " [t] he Supreme Court's treatment of monopsony cases strongly
suggests that suppliers .. . are protected by antitrust laws even when the anti-
competitive activity does not harm end-users."4 2
The point is made even more clearly in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., in which the Court considered predatory purchasing by
an alleged monopsonist.4 3 The Court heavily emphasized the parallel nature of
monopoly and monopsony conduct as an economic and- the Court concluded-
legal matter. The Court recognized that conduct directed to input markets
might-but not always-also affect competition in output markets, and the
Court was at pains not to rely on such an effect.44 It expressly presumed that there
was no output market effect in the case at hand, and repeatedly noted that the
adverse effects here would be felt only in input markets.45 While Weyerhaeuser
was a case about predation, not merger or horizontal agreement, the locus of
harm is the same. This result echoes the legislative history of the Sherman Act,
which reveals an abiding concern with the welfare of workers and sellers of ag-
ricultural products, not only purchasers.4 6
Turning to mergers, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the
DOJ and FTC come to the same conclusion. Section 12 explicitly indicates that
41. 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948) (footnotes omitted). The Court is not perfectly clear on this point
since it also saw an effect in output markets. Id. at 241.
42. Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3 d 1124, 1133-34 (ioth Cit. 2002).
43. 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
44. Id. at 321-24.
45. Id. at 324-25 ("Even if output prices remain constant, a predatory bidder can use its power as
the predominant buyer of inputs to force down input prices and capture monopsony prof-
its."); see also id. at 321 (noting that the case did not "present a risk of significantly increased
concentration" in output markets); id. at 321 n.2 (noting and distinguishing an alternative
setting, not present in Weyerhaeuser, in which a "monopsonist could ... also recoup its losses
by raising output prices").
46. See Werden, supra note 4, at 713-16 (describing this history); Renata Hesse, Acting Assistant
Att'y General, And Never the Twain Shall Meet? Connecting Popular and Professional Visions
for Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks at 2016 Global Enforcement Symposium (Sep. 20, 2016),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-renata-hesse
-antitrust-division-delivers-opening [http://perma.cc/F7RN-KSJN] (relying in part on the
Sherman Act's legislative history for the conclusion that "a merger that gives a company the
power to depress wages or salaries or to reduce the prices it pays for inputs is illegal whether
or not it also gives that company the power to increase prices downstream").
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in a merger of buyers, enforcement agencies focus on the harm to sellers.4 7 Ef-
fects on downstream markets are merely a secondary consideration.4 8 To illus-
trate these points, the Guidelines offer an example in which two buyers merge,
and the relevant harm is a wealth transfer from farmers to the merged buyer,
without any output effect.4 9 This evidence contradicts the erroneous suggestion
made by the FTC that section 12 focuses upon or is limited to output-side harm.
For example, in a statement closing its investigation of a merger of two pharmacy
benefit managers (PBMs), the FTC summarized its analysis as follows:
The Commission also considered whether the proposed acquisition
would confer monopsony power on the merged company when it nego-
tiates dispensing fees with retail pharmacies. As a general matter, trans-
actions that allow firms to reduce the costs of input products have a high
likelihood of benefitting consumers, since lower costs create incentives
to lower prices. Only in special circumstances does an increase in power
in negotiating input prices adversely impact consumers. See Merger
Guidelines § 12. The Commission examined this concern closely but
found that the proposed transaction was unlikely to create or enhance
monopsony power.so
The closing statement gives the erroneous impression that section 12 is focused
on harm to downstream purchasers or final consumers. Commentators have
been similarly led astray." In fact, the Guidelines support the opposite conclu-
sion that the proper focus is harm to sellers.
47. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 12, at 32-33
(2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/loos9hmg.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G8AZ-EX9K] [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (stating
that when suppliers have few alternatives to merging buyers, "the Agencies may conclude that
the merger of competing buyers is likely to lessen competition in a manner harmful to
sellers").
48. Id. at 33 ("Nor do the Agencies evaluate the competitive effects of mergers between competing
buyers strictly, or even primarily, on the basis of effects in the downstream markets in which
the merging firms sell.").
49. Id. (Example 24); see also Peter Carstensen, Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
Minor Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 775, 780 (2012) (emphasizing this
aspect of the Guidelines).
50. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning the Proposed Acquisition of Medco
Health Solutions by Express Scripts, Inc., FTC File No. 111-021o, at 7 (Apr. 2, 2012), http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/closing_1etters/proposed-acquisition-medco
-health-solutions-inc.express-scripts-inc./12o402expressmedcostatement.pdf [http://perma
.cc/2Q7P-S5Z3] [hereinafter FTC Express Scripts Closing Statement]. We discuss this closing
statement in greater detail in Section II.B.
51. See, e.g., Rani Habash & John Scalf, An Inside Look at Monopsony Issues in the FTC's Express
Scripts-Medco Merger Investigation, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE, Sept. 2012, at 24, 25
2090
127:2078 2018
MERGERS THAT HARM SELLERS
Overall, this evidence challenges the view that antitrust law is solely con-
cerned with the welfare of downstream purchasers or final consumers.5 2 The ev-
idence is more consistent with the view that antitrust law protects the competi-
tive process," in service of preserving the welfare of the merging parties' trading
partners, whether buyers or sellers. Indeed, when courts and commentators refer
to "consumer welfare," often they really mean the welfare of trading partners.54
Such invocations of "consumer welfare" are the natural result of living in a world
where the issue in most cases is reduced competition between sellers, and the
harmed trading partners are their downstream purchasers. The imprecision of
the phrase "consumer welfare" is hardly surprising, as can be seen in the fact that
a merger of competing intermediate good providers is actionable, even though
the effect is felt in the first instance by purchasing firms, not final consumers."
& n.9 (erroneously citing section 12 for the proposition that "[i]mportantly, however, the
agencies stress that mergers resulting in decreased prices paid by the merged firm are not
necessarily anticompetitive, but often create procompetitive efficiencies that lower prices for
consumers").
52. See, e.g., Werden, supra note 4, at 717-19 (concluding that monopsony case outcomes are in-
consistent with a sole focus on the welfare of downstream purchasers or final consumers); see
also Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J. 1509, 1543-48
(2013) (similar). By contrast, Steve Salop argues that monopsony case outcomes are con-
sistent with an approach that only counts the welfare of final consumers. See Salop, supra note
40, at 342-43. Salop does not analyze cases such as Mandeville Island Farms and Weyerhaueser,
instead pointing to Kartell v. Blue Shield ofMass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (ist Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.).
Kartell denied liability for an insurer's agreements to prevent "balance billing." Although
sometimes invoked as a buy-side cartel case, read in context, the Kartell court appeared to
view the arrangement- an insurer purchasing care on behalf of its customers - as a mere ex-
ercise of market power, rather than a buy-side horizontal restraint. Id.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F-3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cit. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam) (defining anticompetitive effect in terms of "harm [to] the competitive process");
Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17,21 (ist Cit. 1990) (Breyer, J.) (" [A] practice
is 'anticompetitive' only if it harms the competitive process."); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron
Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (ist Cit. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (similar); Morrison v. Murray
Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1437 ( 7th Cit. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("The purpose of antitrust law, at
least as articulated in the modern cases, is to protect the competitive process as a means of
promoting economic efficiency.").
54. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2 (interpreting the oft-cited principle that "antitrust protects
consumers not competitors" as a "metaphor" for recognizing harm to "trading partners," not
only final consumers, and concluding that " [a] merger that increases market power and ena-
bles the merged firm to impose worse terms on its trading partners is equally objectionable if
the trading partners in question are suppliers to, or buyers from, that firm"); Shapiro Testi-
mony, supra note 4 (stating that "consumer welfare," properly understood, includes sellers
harmed by lost competition between buyers).
5s. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d loo (D.D.C. 2016) (blocking a merger of office
supply companies due to reduced competition in the market for the sale and distribution of
consumable office supplies to large businesses buying for their own use); FTC v. Sysco Corp.,
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Nor does the embrace of trading partner welfare imply embrace of a total
welfare standard, even though both of them credit the effect on firms to some
degree.56 The weakness of a total welfare test is not the inclusion of a firm in the
welfare maximand, but rather the inclusion of the welfare of the firm or firms
causing the reduction in competition. Attention to trading partner welfare does
not have this problem.
The normative basis for a trading partner welfare approach may be briefly
stated. When a merger suppresses competition between rivals for a seller's busi-
ness, ordinarily we may expect, in addition to the harm to workers or other
sellers, inefficiency and consumer harm. For example, the exercise of increased
classical monopsony power usually has an adverse effect on downstream pur-
chasers, even where that effect is not directly measured. To be sure, in a particular
case it may be possible to argue that the merger is actually harmless or even ben-
eficial. The trading partner welfare perspective reflects an implicit judgment that
a fine-grained search for case-specific exceptions carries an unacceptable risk of
false negatives.
Such shortcuts are common. Antitrust law does not give cartel defendants
license to show that their particular cartel is actually beneficial. In a merger of
sellers, courts do not require the plaintiff to trace the merger's price effects
through multiple levels of production to measure the impact on final consumers;
nor is case law sympathetic to a defense that the merger would improve welfare
by raising downstream prices that have been inefficiently suppressed by monop-
sony. Instead, courts appropriately accept harm to downstream purchasers as ev-
idence of impairment to competition. The same is true when the harm is up-
stream. In this way, a trading partner welfare approach dismisses, as hubris, the
attempt to trace out and weigh every effect of the merger.
Overall, then, a trading partner welfare approach accords well with the case
law and economic reasoning, and under this approach, a merger that results in
increased classical monopsony power may be condemned on account of harm to
the input market.
2015-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶79,221, 2015 WL 8856221 (D.D.C. 2015) (blocking a merger of com-
peting distributors of food to restaurants and other businesses).
56. The same can be said of a "consumer welfare" standard that, in intermediate goods cases,
counts the welfare of the purchasing firms. The fact that such a standard takes account of the
welfare of (some) firms does not imply embrace of a total welfare approach.
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II. INCREASED BARGAINING LEVERAGE
A. Increased Leverage by Sellers
Some exercises of buyer power do not fit the classical monopsony model in
which large buyers face atomistic sellers with no market power. Instead, trans-
actions are mediated through bilateral bargaining between differentiated buyers
and sellers. Here, the key monopsony distortion-withholding purchases of the
input to move along an input supply curve - may be absent. But anticompetitive
effects may nonetheless arise.
It is common in such settings for the upstream and downstream firms to
negotiate over whether the upstream firm's products are included in a bundle of
inputs offered for sale by the downstream firm, and the economic terms - such
as prices, quantities, transfer payments, and contractual restraints - that are as-
sociated with making those upstream products available to customers of the
downstream firm. Economic models of these negotiations,7 generally based on
the concept of Nash bargaining, suppose that parties bargain over the division of
surplus, or value, from reaching an agreement. The bargaining outcome is in-
fluenced by two factors. First is relative bargaining power, which determines the
fraction of the surplus from agreement hat each party captures. It is common to
assume that surplus is split in half, but the actual division will depend on, inter
alia, relative bargaining proficiency and patience, and any split between o% and
oo% is possible. This is independent of the second factor, bargaining leverage,
which affects the magnitude of the surplus, and derives from each party's outside
option, or walk-away value." The potential anticompetitive effect of a merger
57. The seminal paper is John F. Nash, Jr., TheBargainingProblem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950);
important later work includes Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, Bilateral Monopolies and In-
centivesfor Mergers, 19 RAND J. ECON. 408 (1988). For applications to health care, see Gautam
Gowrisankaran et al., Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Mergers,
105 AM. ECON. REv. 172 (2015); Matthew Grennan, Price Discrimination and Price Bargaining,
Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 145 (2013); and Kate Ho & Robin
S. Lee, Insurer Competition in Health Care Markets, 85 ECONOMETRICA 379 (2017). Hospitals
provided an early application of bargaining models to empirical merger analysis by the FTC
and DOJ. See, e.g., Cory S. Capps et al.,Antitrust Policy and Hospital Mergers: Recommendations
for a New Approach, 47 ANTITRUST BuLL. 677 (2002); Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and
Two-Stage Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 671 (2000).
58. Some commentators and courts use the term "bargaining power" to include what we mean
by bargaining leverage. We maintain the distinction to focus attention on the competitive im-
pact of a merger, which is exercised through increased leverage. See Aviv Nevo, Deputy Assis-
tant Att'y General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Mergers that Increase Bargaining Lev-
erage, Remarks as Prepared for the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and
Cornerstone Research Conference on Antitrust in Highly Innovative Industries (Jan. 22,
2014).
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derives from the latter: by depressing the walk-away value to firms opposite the
merging parties, a merger can enable the parties to increase their profits at the
expense of those against whom they negotiate.
For a concrete example, consider the health insurance market. Each insurer
negotiates with a set of upstream hospitals over inclusion in the insurer's net-
work and the prices of hospital services provided to the insurer's customers,
among other terms. If insurers' customers value broad provider networks, and
hospitals value access to large groups of potential patients, each insurer may have
an interest in reaching agreements to include every hospital in the insurer's net-
work, and vice versa.
To understand this dynamic, we begin with a merger of sellers - here, hos-
pitals-before turning to a merger of buyers (insurers). For example, in 2010,
the FTC considered a merger of two of the four hospital providers in Lucas
County, Ohio." From an insurer's perspective, each hospital in Lucas County
represents an alternative way to provide health care access to its customers.6 0 Its
surplus from a particular hospital contract is the difference between the insurer's
plan value without that hospital in its network (the insurer's walk away value)
and its value with the agreement to provide access to that hospital to its insured
population at the agreed upon service prices.
There is a direct connection between the shape of an insurer's value function
and the competition between hospitals for inclusion in its network.61 Suppose
each additional in-network hospital bed provides exactly the same incremental
value to an insurer -a linear value function. Negotiations would split the sur-
plus, say in half, and we would expect no better per bed terms for larger hospitals
than for smaller ones. In this case, hospitals are not competitive substitutes for
the insurer -the insurer's value of each hospital with (say) 500 beds is the same
whether or not other hospitals are in the insurer's network. A merger of two
hospitals proportionally scales total surplus and would not change the negoti-
ated per bed split. If, instead, the incremental value to the insurer of access to
hospital beds is diminishing -each additional bed added to the network has
slightly less value than the one before - we would describe the value function as
concave. And empirical evidence suggests that the insurer's value function is typ-
ically concave.62 The consequence of concavity is that we expect larger hospitals
59. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 55 9 (6th Cir. 2014).
6o. We use "customers" loosely to include those who directly purchase insurance through indi-
vidual policies, and those who are insured through employer-sponsored insurance plans.
61. For discussion, see Nevo, supra note 58.
62. Concavity extends even to cross-market hospital systems. See, e.g., Cory Capps et al., Compe-
tition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. 737 (2003); Gowrisan-
karan et al., supra note 57; Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Hospital Systems and Bargain-
ing Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, 48 RAND J. ECON. 579 (2017); Leemore
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to strike better deals on a per-customer basis, all else equal, reflecting their ability
to impose a worse walk-away value on the insurer.63
A hypothetical may help illustrate the connection of concavity with compe-
tition. Suppose there are four equal-sized hospitals, and an insurer's network is
most valuable if it offers access to all four. But an employer's willingness to pay
for a plan with more in-network hospitals increases less than proportionately
with the number of hospitals - access to the first hospital in network is worth a
lot, but the value increments decrease as the number of in-network hospitals ex-
pands. The employer is willing to pay almost as much for a plan that includes
three of the four hospitals as for one with all four- say, just a few percent less.
This concavity is illustrated in Figure 1.
Dafny et al., The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 22106, 2017).
63. Value functions need not be concave, or even linear, and in those markets larger buyers would
not exercise greater leverage. See Hans-Theo Normann et al., Do Buyer-Size Discounts Depend
on the Curvature of the Surplus Function? Experimental Tests of Bargaining Models, 38 RAND J.
ECON. 747 (2007).
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FIGURE 1.
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Each hospital, if included, adds 500 beds to the network. Competition is re-
flected in the high walk-away value for adding the fourth hospital (designated
by H) -if the insurer fails to reach an agreement with one hospital, other hospi-
tals provide substitute ways to deliver in-network hospital access to the insurer's
customers. So, if the insurer negotiates independently with these four hospi-
tals - as it would under competition- each negotiation is over the difference in
the insurer's value between access to three-fourths of hospitals (1,5oo beds) and
access to all hospitals (2,000 beds) -the surplus at risk in each of those inde-
pendent negotiations, represented by M in Figure 1.
Now consider a merger between two hospitals, now controlling 1,ooo beds.
No longer are their negotiations independent. When the insurer negotiates with
this hospital, its walk-away value becomes the insurer's value with access to only
half of the hospitals (1,ooo beds). By eliminating competition between them-
selves, the merging hospitals force a disagreement outcome on the insurer (the
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amount M+N in Figure 1) that is worse than twice the cost of losing a single
hospital (the total of 2M in Figure 1), increasing the merged hospital's bargain-
ing leverage and the value it can extract from insurers. In this scenario, the mer-
ger harms insurers.
One difference from the classical monopsony setting considered in Part I
bears note. The principal immediate effect of increased bargaining leverage may
be a transfer between the insurer and the hospital. If the bargaining is "efficient"
in an economic sense, there may not be a reduction in quantity or accompanying
deadweight loss from the transfer, although that outcome is not inevitable or
guaranteed.64 Thus, a bargaining theory of harm raises the following question:
does a transfer suffice, even without any reduction in output? An economist fo-
cused on total welfare might naively respond that a "mere" transfer does not af-
fect total welfare. But one cannot assume that an apparently efficient bargain
from the standpoint of the two parties necessarily results only in a wealth trans-
fer between the parties. Contracts are likely to be inherently incomplete, provid-
ing room for parties to adapt ex post away from the efficient outcome toward
their unilateral best response, leading to deadweight loss.6 5 For example, firms
may reduce investments in maintaining or improving product quality or quan-
tities, as their returns are reduced by their trading partners' bargaining lever-
age.66 Or firms may use their leverage to extract contractual terms that further
reduce competition by raising rivals' costs or impeding rivals' access to mar-
kets.6 7
Moreover, courts do not generally insist that a purchaser, harmed due to re-
duced competition among the sellers, show not only its own loss in the form of
a higher price paid but also a deadweight loss. Recognizing a harm from transfer
is also consistent with the ordinary calculation of damages to purchasers, which
provides a recovery measured by the overcharge, not deadweight loss.6 8
64. Efficient bargaining assumes that the two sides maximize the total surplus, then negotiate a
division, avoiding output reductions and deadweight loss, at least in a static sense.
65. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker et al., Merger To Monopoly to Serve a Single Buyer: Comment, 75
ANTITRUST L.J. 637, 638-41 (2008); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AM.
ECON. REV. 1731 (2017).
66. See Noll, supra note 12, at 608-o9.
67. In the hospital-insurer context, see, for example, Complaint, United States v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, No. 3:16-cv-00311-RJC-DCK (W.D.N.C. June 9, 2016).
The complaint alleges that the Carolinas Healthcare System uses its market power to negoti-
ate not only high prices for its services (allowable under the antitrust laws), but also contrac-
tual terms, such as prohibitions on insurers steering patients to low-cost providers or provid-
ing patients with information on relative costs across providers, to further reduce competition
with other health care providers in the market. Id. While this case addresses unilateral conduct
by the defendant, this mechanism also could generate competitive harm in a merger context.
68. See Noll, supra note 12, at 612-13.
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Increased bargaining leverage is a source of competitive harm. The leading
case on this point, ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. FTC,6 9 arose from the FTC's
challenge to the Lucas County hospital merger between ProMedica, the domi-
nant provider in the county, and St. Luke's, a smaller rival.70 In an opinion af-
firming an administrative law judge's order of divestiture, the Sixth Circuit of-
fered an unusually clear statement of the bargaining leverage theory. The court
explained that larger hospitals have more bargaining leverage over managed care
organizations (MCOs), a type of insurer:
It is harder for an MCO to exclude the county's most dominant hospital
system than it is for the MCO to exclude a single hospital that services
just one corner of the county- a corner, moreover, that the dominant
system also services. And that means the MCOs' walk-away point for the
dominant system is higher - perhaps much higher - than it is for the sin-
gle hospital. Here, the record bears out that conclusion: ProMedica's
rates before the merger were among the highest in the State, while St.
Luke's rates did not even cover its cost of patient care. That was true even
though St. Luke's quality ratings on the whole were better than Pro-
Medica's."
The court observed that while MCOs in the county generally had offered net-
works that included all four hospital providers, they at times successfully offered
networks with only three, including networks that omitted ProMedica,72 sug-
gesting that no single provider was a "must have." The court concluded that the
merger would raise prices by increasing ProMedica's bargaining leverage."
Beyond ProMedica, courts have accepted increased bargaining leverage as a
theory of harm in other FTC challenges to mergers of health care providers.74
69. 749 F.3d 5 59 (6 th Cir. 2014).
70. Id. at 561.
71. Id. at 563.
72. Id. at 562.
73. Id. at 569-70.
74. See, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke's Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV-
oo56o-BLW, 1:13-CV-oo116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *9 (D. IdahoJan. 24,2014), aff1d, 778
F.3d 775 ( 9 th Cir. 2015) (finding a significant increase in "bargaining leverage with health
plans" post-acquisition); id. at *io-11 (discussing leverage and "best alternative to a negoti-
ated agreement" at length); FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 346 (3d Cir.
2016) ("The Government's evidence shows that the increase in the Hospitals' bargaining lev-
erage as a result of the merger will allow the post-merger combined Hershey/Pinnacle to prof-
itably impose a SSNIP on payors."); FTC v. Advocate Health Care, No. 15 C 11473, 2017 WL
1022015, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ("A hospital has more bargaining leverage if there are fewer
substitutes for it that can be included in the insurer's network; the insurer has more leverage
if there are more substitutes for the hospital.").
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The FTC and DOJ have also identified increased bargaining leverage of sellers
as a basis for challenging mergers in a variety of industries. For example, the
FTC voted to challenge a 1996 merger of drug store chains on concerns that the
merger would worsen the outside option for PBMs that, much like insurers,
build networks of providers." The DOJ insisted on divestitures as a condition
for approving a 2000 merger of competing providers of "aggregation, promo-
tion, and distribution of residential broadband content," on the ground that the
merger would confer increased leverage in selling these services to broadband
content providers.76 In 2016, the DOJ settled a merger of broadcasters whose
combination, the agency argued, would yield, inter alia, increased leverage in the
sale of retransmission rights to multichannel video programmer distributors
(MVPDs) such as traditional cable companies and satellite distributors."
B. Increased Leverage by Buyers
Those cases all involved increased bargaining leverage by merging sellers.
We are now ready to consider the symmetric upstream case, in which buyers
combine and thereby increase their bargaining leverage against a seller. For ex-
ample, suppose two insurers merge. Whether there is increased leverage now
75. Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N 13
(20o6), http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/801216/download [http://perma.cc/YQ9N-95F6]
("Rite Aid and Revco constrained one another's pricing leverage with PBMs in bargaining for
inclusion in PBM networks .... A high proportion of PBM plan enrollees would have con-
sidered the merged entity to be their preferred pharmacy chain, leaving PBMs with less at-
tractive options for assembling networks that did not include the merged firm. This would
have empowered the merged firm successfully to charge higher dispensing fees as a condition
of participating in a network."). The proposed merger was abandoned in 1996 after the FTC
voted to block it. Rite Aid Abandons Proposed Acquisition of Revco after FTC Sought to BI[o]ck
Transaction, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Apr. 24, 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press
-releases/1996/04/rite-aid-abandons-proposed-acquisition-revco-after-ftc-sought [ht p://
perma.cc/4BVN-HDTJ].
76. Competitive Impact Statement at 12, United States v. AT&T Corp., No. 1:00-cv-01176
(D.D.C. May 25, 2000) ("If the proposed merger [between AT&T and MediaOne] were con-
summated, concentration in the market for aggregation, promotion, and distribution of resi-
dential broadband content and services would be substantially increased .... AT&T would
have substantially increased leverage in dealing with broadband content providers, which it
could use to extract more favorable terms for such services.").
77. Complaint at II, United States v. Nexstar Broad. Grp., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-o1772 (D.D.C. Sept.
2, 2016) ("Post-acquisition, Nexstar would gain the ability to threaten MVPDs in each of the
DMA Markets with the simultaneous blackout of at least two major broadcast networks: its
own network(s) and Media General's network(s). That hreatened loss of programming, and
the resulting diminution of an MVPD's subscribers and profits, would significantly
strengthen Nexstar's bargaining position with MVPDs.").
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depends, inter alia, on the curvature of the hospital's value function. If larger in-
surers exert greater leverage in their negotiations with hospitals, as would result
from a diminishing incremental value of a hospital's access to an additional in-
sured prospective patient similar to Figure 1, then the merger will reduce pro-
vider payments from the insurer.
Our conclusion in Part I -that a harm to input markets suffices to establish
an antitrust violation - applies not only to increased classical monopsony power
but also to increased bargaining leverage. The cases discussed in Part I establish
that a buy-side harm is sufficient, and cases such as ProMedica establish that in-
creased bargaining leverage is an actionable harm. Once again, there is a harm
to the competitive process that lowers the welfare of the merging parties' trading
partners.
A recent example is the proposed merger of two health insurers, Anthem and
Cigna. The government objected to the merger on the ground (among others)
that it would harm competition in the purchase of services from health care pro-
viders in specified local markets.7 9 The foregoing analysis supports the conclu-
sion that if Anthem and Cigna were able to secure lower reimbursement rates to
health care providers through increased bargaining leverage, this would consti-
tute an actionable harm.
The Anthem- Cigna challenge illustrates another point: the parties to a mer-
ger that increases buy-side bargaining leverage are often also competitors in out-
put markets. The loss of competition in output markets is usually the main focus
of an antitrust challenge, and the claim of lost competition between competing
buyers may never be decided. In Anthem-Cigna, the DOJ also objected to the
merger as anticompetitive in two classes of product markets: the sale of insur-
ance to national accounts and the sale of insurance to large groups in specified
78. To analyze effects of an insurer merger on the insurer's leverage, the vertical axis of Figure 1
would be replaced with the value to an individual hospital of adding insured lives to its po-
tential patients, and the horizontal axis would measure the number of insured lives with con-
tracts for service at the hospital. For evidence of this effect, see, for example, Leemore Dafny
et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance Industry,
102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161 (2012), and Ho & Lee, supra note 57. See also Brief of Professors as
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees and Affirmance at 5-6, United States v. Anthem, Inc.,
855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Nos. 17-5024, 17-5028), 2017 WL 1075800 (collecting evidence
that higher insurer concentration is associated with lower payments to providers). Insurer
mergers may also increase the insurer's leverage by improving its walk-away value.
79. Complaint at 26-27, United States v. Anthem, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-o1493 (D.D.C. July 21, 2016)
(quoting Anthem executive's statement hat "the more patients doctors and hospitals see from
[an insurance] carrier, the more leverage that carrier has to negotiate the best arrangements
in the market" and alleging that Anthem recognized that "rate reductions would not result
from any additional efficiencies or potentially procompetitive volume discounts").
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local markets. The district court enjoined the merger on the basis of lost compe-
tition in product markets,so and this ruling was upheld on appeal." The courts
never reached the claim of lost competition between competing buyers.
The FTC has taken a different approach. In 2004, the FTC investigated a
merger of two PBMs, Caremark and AdvancePCS.82 PBMs negotiate the price
paid to pharmacies, and hence play a role analogous to health insurers negotiat-
ing with health care providers. The FTC considered, as one theory of harm,
whether the merged parties might exercise increased buy-side power and
thereby reduce drug dispensing fees paid to the pharmacies. Ultimately, the
agency decided to close its investigation without challenging the transaction and
issued a statement explaining its decision." The closing statement acknowl-
edged a possible increase in PBMs' bargaining power, resulting in lower fees paid
to the pharmacy.84 Nevertheless, the FTC dismissed this effect as harmless. In its
view, "competition" would be unaffected provided that the quantity purchased
did not fall."
In 2012, the FTC embraced the same position in a closing statement explain-
ing its decision not to challenge a second PBM merger between Express Scripts
and Medco.86 This time, the agency concluded that pharmacy reimbursement
rates would not be affected by the merger, but then proceeded to explain its an-
alytical approach if post-merger reimbursement rates had been expected to fall.
The FTC saw no problem unless there would be a quantity reduction on the part
80. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 178-79 (D.D.C. 2017).
81. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
82. See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, In re Caremark Rx, Inc./AdvancePCS, File No.
031 0239, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/cases/2004/o2/o4o211ftcstatemento3lo239.pdf [http://perma.cc/65BG-8Z46]
[hereinafter FTC Caremark Closing Statement].
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3 ("At most, the acquisition is likely to increase the bargaining power of the merged PBM
and to increase its shares (and correspondingly reduce the pharmacies' shares) of the gains
flowing from contracts between the PBM and the pharmacies.").
85. Id. at 2 ("Nor do competition and consumers suffer when the increased bargaining power of
large buyers allows them to obtain lower input prices without decreasing overall input pur-
chases."). The FTC asserted that if the benefit is passed through to consumers, the ffect is
not just harmless but procompetitive. Id. ("This bargaining power is procompetitive when it
allows the buyer to reduce its costs and decrease prices to its customers."). We criticize this
view, to the extent that the lower prices are the result of increased bargaining leverage, infra
Part III.
86. FTC Express Scripts Closing Statement, supra note So.
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of the input providers.7 That approach effectively limits buy-side cases to in-
creased classical monopsony power and excludes many instances of increased
bargaining leverage, an outcome the closing statement appears to contemplate."
(A more extreme reading of the closing statement is that the FTC employed an
approach that we criticize in section I.B, by requiring a demonstrated harm to
final consumers.") Beyond PBMs, the FTC has taken a similar position in eval-
uating a grocery store merger.0 Similarly, some commentators insist upon an
adverse effect on the quantity or quality supplied.
87. Id. at 8 ("Moreover, even if the transaction enables the merged firm to reduce the reimburse-
ment it offers to network pharmacies, there is no evidence that this would result in reduced
output or curtailment of pharmacy services generally." (emphasis added)). The "output" referred
to is the output of the pharmacies.
88. For example, the agency characterized the actionable theory of harm purely in monopsony
terms. Id. at 1-2 ("Another question, raised by retail pharmacies and consumer groups, was
whether the combined firm could exercise monopsony power, driving drug dispensing fees so
low that that they would threaten the important services offered by local pharmacies."). In a
footnote supporting its conclusion that reduced pharmacy reimbursement would have no ef-
fect on pharmacy output, the FTC stated: "The Commission has previously found [in Care-
mark/AdvancePCS] that the market for the retail dispensing of brand name and generic pre-
scription drugs is not susceptible to monopsony power for several reasons, including the fact
that dispensing fees are negotiated individually between each PBM and each pharmacy." Id. at
8 n.15. In other words, PBM-pharmacy agreements are negotiated, rather than dictated by a
competitive supply curve.
89. The primary thrust of the FTC's buy-side analysis, quoted supra in text accompanying note
50, is the effect on consumers. See id. at 7 (noting the consumer benefit from lower input
prices, asserting the rareness of consumer harm, and stating that the "Commission examined
this concern closely;" apparently a reference to a concern about consumer harm). The closing
statement then turned, in the "Moreover" statement quoted supra note 87, to the secondary
possibility of "reduced output or curtailment of pharmacy services generally." The pharmacies'
output is not merely an input into the PBM's product, but also directly incorporated into the
PBM's offering to its customers. Under the more extreme reading, the FTC considered the
pharmacies' output not because input providers are relevant in their own right, but only to
the extent that changes in input provision also alter the final product consumed.
go. In evaluating the 2002 acquisition of Supermercados Amigo by Wal-Mart, the FTC consid-
ered the possibility of increased classical monopsony power but not other theories of enhanced
buyer power. Its analysis was limited to a scenario in which the buyer reduces the input price
by "scaling back purchases" See Letter from the FTC to Albert A. Foer, President of the Amer-
ican Antitrust Institute (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/cases/2003/o2/ftc.gov-letterfoer.htm [http://perma.cc/P5LY-PR4B].
91. See Dennis W. Carlton & Mark Israel, Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review, 39
REv. INDUS. ORG. 127, 128 (2011) (insisting upon a decrease in total surplus); John D. Shively,
When Does Buyer PowerBecome Monopsony Pricing?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2012, at 87, 87; Jonathan
M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony, and Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1 (1991) (arguing against liability where there is no demonstrated reduction in quantity
supplied); Jonathan M. Jacobson, Monopsony 2013: Still Not Truly Symmetric, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Dec. 2013 (similar); see also BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 6, at 230 (doubting the
role for antitrust in "all-or-none" negotiations that transfer wealth to monopsonists).
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Given the similarity between insurers negotiating with health providers and
PBMs negotiating with pharmacies, the FTC statement strikingly contrasts with
the DOJ's approach.92 We disagree with the approach outlined in the FTC clos-
ing statements for reasons well illustrated by the FTC's successful challenges in
ProMedica and other sell-side cases." When a disruption of the competitive pro-
cess results in harm to the trading partner, that harm is actionable, whether the
trading partner is a buyer or a seller, and whether or not there is an additional
effect on quantity.
To put the point more directly, insisting on a quantity effect is not required
in sell side merger enforcement. Suppose a merger of sellers permitted the
merged firm to raise prices to purchasers, whether intermediate purchasers or
final consumers, but "merely" raised prices without any reduction in the quantity
purchased. Arguing that the merger is harmless unless allocative inefficiency can
be shown would not be an effective defense. Antitrust is not a blank check to
engage in global welfare maximization. The right conclusion is that such a mer-
ger distorts the competitive process, with consequent harm to purchasers.
The normative basis for this approach mirrors the discussion in Section I.B.
When a merger suppresses competition between rivals for a seller's business, or-
dinarily we may expect - in addition to the immediate harm to sellers - a welfare
loss. The exercise of increased bargaining leverage is likely to have this effect,
even where that effect is not directly measured. Once again, in a particular case
it may be possible to argue that the merger is harmless or even beneficial. For
example, a defendant might argue that an increase in buy-side "countervailing
power" will offset sellers' existing market power and thereby move input prices
closer to a social ideal of marginal costs. Courts are equally reluctant to adjudi-
cate the defense that a merger of hospitals offsets the existing power of insurers,
and the reciprocal claim that a merger of insurers offsets the existing power of
hospitals. Here, once again, the trading partner welfare perspective reflects an
implicit judgment that a fine-grained search for case-specific exceptions carries
an unacceptable risk of false negatives.
In a bargaining leverage case, the most common harm is to the bargained-
for price, but buyers may choose to exercise their increased leverage to extract
92. Compare FTC Express Scripts Closing Statement, supra note 5o (concluding that reduced re-
imbursements to retail pharmacies are harmless), with Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memoran-
dum on the Buy-Side Case at 6-7, United States v. Anthem, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-o1493 (D.D.C.
Dec. 19, 2016) (arguing that reduced reimbursements to health care providers is actionable,
without needing to prove reduction in quantity or quality supplied). See also Sallet, supra note
9, at 82 (noting the difference in agency approach); Shively, supra note 91, at 90 (noting the
contrast between the FTC closing statement in Express Scripts and contemporaneous state-
ments by DOJ officials).
93. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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non-price concessions instead.94 For example, the DOJ and Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) expressed concern that increased bargaining lever-
age resulting from the 2016 merger of Charter Communications with Time
Warner Cable would be used to disadvantage emerging rivals in online video
distribution (OVD):
The combination ... will result in a larger MVPD with a greater ability
and incentive to secure restrictions on programmers that limit or fore-
close OVD access to important content.. .. With more to gain from im-
posing ... contractual restrictions and with greater bargaining leverage
with programmers to insist on such provisions, New Charter will be
well-positioned to restrain continued OVD growth by limiting or fore-
closing OVD access to the video content that is vital to their competitive-
ness.9
Ultimately, the merged entity agreed to restrictions on its ability to obtain terms
in contracts with video programmers that would limit or discourage provision
of programming to OVDs.9 6 The settlement put these provisions in place for
seven years, "long enough to ensure that New Charter cannot harm OVD com-
petitors at a crucial point in their development while accounting for the rapidly
evolving nature of the video distribution market."'
Recognizing the harm to sellers from a merger of buyers, whether due to
increased classical monopsony power or increased bargaining leverage, has two
important practical implications. First, addressing these harms to competitive
markets is critical to preventing underenforcement of merger law. A collateral
94. This effect is analogous to a seller's use of increased bargaining leverage to disadvantage com-
peting sellers. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The issue arises not only in merger
cases but in single-firm conduct cases as well. See, e.g., Complaint at 19-22, United States v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 2:10-CV-1415 5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2010) (alleging that
the insurer used its market power to negotiate most favored nations clauses with hospitals
that raised the price of hospital services to rival insurers). Competition agencies also may be
concerned about a "waterbed effect,' in which lower prices for a dominant buyer increase the
input prices paid by its downstream competitors, reducing downstream competition. See
OECD Report, supra note 13, at 47-53.
95. Complaint at 4, United States v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., No. 1: 16-cv-oo759 (D.D.C. Apr. 25,
2016).
96. Final Judgment at 5, United States v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-oo759 (D.D.C.
Sept. 9, 2016).
97. Competitive Impact Statement at 20, United States v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-
00759 (D.D.C. May 10, 2016).
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benefit is avoiding an arms race in which sellers feel compelled to merge in re-
sponse to a merger of buyers, in order to offset the resulting market power. Sec-
ond, as discussed in the next Part, recognizing the buy-side harm plays an im-
portant role in ruling out certain claimed benefits from a merger.
III. LOWER INPUT PRICES AS A MERGER BENEFIT
In some instances, lower input prices can be considered a benefit of the mer-
ger, rather than (as discussed in Parts I and II) a manifestation of harm. For
example, suppose two automobile manufacturers merge. Post-merger, they
standardize the transmissions used in their vehicles. At the new higher level of
production, the transmissions supplier enjoys economies of scale in manufactur-
ing, reducing both its cost of supply to the merged firm and the price it charges
to the firm.
Agencies and courts evaluate such an effect as part of a so-called "efficiencies
defense."" Efficiencies evidence is deployed to rebut a plaintiff's evidence that
the challenged transaction will tend to raise prices in output markets." In par-
ticular, lower input prices, passed through to purchasers, may produce down-
ward pressure on output prices. The downward price pressure counteracts up-
ward price pressure from reduced competition in output markets. In our
automobile example, the savings from the lower acquisition cost of transmis-
sions would reduce the final cost of producing cars, all else equal, working
against the auto manufacturer's incentive to raise prices. The defense applies
only to the extent that the lower prices reduce marginal costs, and those benefits
are passed through to purchasers.0 0 The key factual question thus becomes: are
98. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § 1o, at 29-31 (describing consid-
eration of efficiencies); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing "offset[ing] ... efficiencies" and considering asserted efficiencies that, according to
merging parties, would "outweigh" anticompetitive effects); United States v. Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 147-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding that efficiencies
counted in favor of permitting merger); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285,
1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff'd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Phila.
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 332-33, 370-71 (1963) (considering and rejecting asserted efficien-
cies); cf United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("Despite ... wide-
spread acceptance of the potential benefit of efficiencies as an economic matter, it is not at all
clear that they offer a viable legal defense to illegality under section 7." (citation omitted)).
99. We follow convention in using the term "defense" informally to refer to this rebuttal evidence.
The Guidelines do not use the term.
i00. The Merger Guidelines and case law thus exclude benefits retained by the merged party, a
type of benefit that arguably would be included under a total welfare approach.
2105
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the input savings large enough, and passed through to purchasers to a sufficient
degree, such that there is no net harm in the output market?"o1
A horizontal merger might produce the relevant efficiencies in input markets
by reducing the cost of supplying the input to the merged firm. One possibility,
as discussed above, is that the input producer may enjoy economies of scale in
manufacturing. If there are economies in manufacturing inputs that are custom-
ized to buyer specifications, a merger combining volume from two buyers into a
single, higher volume specification may reduce upstream costs of that input. Or
greater scale may result in lower transport costs from increasing bulk deliveries
to a larger firm. These reduced costs are the basis for the Guidelines comment
endorsing certain volume-based discounts.102 This type of efficiency is associ-
ated with a (weak) increase in quantity purchased.
Of course, as we have explained,10 a merger might reduce input prices by
reducing competition in input markets, rather than by increasing efficiency.
Might these savings be passed through, and if so, could the savings be recog-
nized in defense of the merger? In the case of increased classical monopsony
power, the argument fails at the first step. A monopsonist recognizes that the
marginal cost of its input, say, labor, is higher than the wage it pays, because
hiring the last unit of labor costs the firm not only the wage paid to that worker,
but also the increase in the prevailing wage paid to all other workers the firm
employs. An increase in monopsony power increases the firm's perceived mar-
ginal cost and reduces output. Far from lowering output prices, the increased
monopsony power raises price in output markets (if the firm faces downward
sloping demand for its output) or else leaves it unchanged. By contrast, increased
bargaining leverage could have the effect of lowering output prices (in addition
to its adverse effect on input markets).
The argument also fails, for either form of reduced competition, at the sec-
ond step. Purported purchaser benefits premised on reductions in competition
are not cognizable.104 This point is reflected in the Guidelines' consideration of
price reductions resulting from a merger, provided that the reduction does not
101. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § 1o, at 30 (describing agencies' analysis
of cognizable efficiencies in terms of "revers [ing] the merger's potential to harm consumers").
102. See id. § 12, at 33 ("A merger that does not enhance market power on the buying side of the
market can nevertheless lead to a reduction in prices paid by the merged firm, for example, by
reducing transactions costs or allowing the merged firm to take advantage of volume-based
discounts."). As discussed below, however, lower input prices accomplished through increased
bargaining leverage are different from a garden-variety volume discount.
103. See supra Parts I and II.
104. The same is true, for analogous reasons, of the argument that an increase in buy-side "coun-
tervailing power" will offset sellers' existing market power and thereby move input prices
closer to a social ideal of marginal costs.
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"aris [e] from the enhancement of market power."o A concurring opinion inAn-
them made the same point: "there is no dispute that, to have any legal relevance,
a proffered efficiency cannot arise from anticompetitive effects."06 And even an
Anthem dissent agreed that purported benefits amounting to "the fruit of a poi-
sonous tree" are not cognizable.o0 The same point is often made in horizontal
agreement cases. For example, engineers cannot refrain from price competition
on the ground that competition will result in shoddy bridges. 1o As the Supreme
Court explained, "the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the
assumption that competition itself is unreasonable."'0 Nor may a horizontal
agreement be defended on the ground that the resulting extra profit induces or
is spent on increased innovation. 0
This conclusion depends on the recognition that the harm to sellers from lost
upstream competition is actionable under antitrust law. Otherwise, a defendant
may argue that purchasers in output markets are benefited, on balance, thanks
to a pass-through of the savings. The FTC appears to have accepted this position
in its assessment of the PBM mergers discussed in Part 11.1"'
105. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § 12, at 33; see also id. ("Reduction in prices
paid by the merging firms not arising from the enhancement of market power can be signifi-
cant in the evaluation of efficiencies from a merger, as discussed in Section lo.").
io6. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 369 (D.C. Cit. 2017) (Millett, J., concurring). The
concurrence cited the dissent on this point, quoting the Guidelines' statement in § lo that
" [c]ognizable efficiencies ... do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or ser-
vice." Id. (quoting id. at 378 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). The statement in § io is fairly read
as a statement about output markets but, as the concurring and dissenting judges in Anthem
recognized, the logic applies symmetrically to input markets.
107. Id. at 378 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The Anthem dissent recognizes increased classical mo-
nopsony power as a source of harm. Id. at 377-78. The opinion does not make a similarly clear
statement about increased bargaining leverage. Its concerns about monopsony do not appear
to include bargaining leverage that effects transfers without associated output reductions. See
id. at 378 (citing treatise discussion limited to monopsony); id. (quoting defendant's conces-
sion that savings premised on increased monopsony power would not be cognizable, includ-
ing counsel's statement hat such an exercise "means a constraint in output"). The dissent also
contrasts monopsony (harmful) with "ordinary bargaining power" (harmless), id. at 377,
though without making any clear reference to increased bargaining leverage.
io8. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
iog. Id.
11o. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
iii. The view is reflected in the FTC's Caremark and Express Scripts closing statements. See FTC
Caremark Closing Statement, supra note 82, at 3 ("It is likely that some of the PBM's increased
shares would be passed through to PBM clients. Although retail pharmacies might be con-
cerned about this outcome, a reduction in dispensing fees following the merger could benefit
consumers'" (footnote omitted)); FTC Express Scripts Closing Statement, supra note So, at 8
("[E]ven if the transaction enables the merged firm to reduce the reimbursement it offers to
network pharmacies ... it is likely that a large portion of any of these cost savings obtained
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There is a further possibility. Even if the harm to input markets from (say)
increased bargaining leverage is actionable, it might nevertheless also be ac-
cepted as a source of savings passed through. The "out-of-market" benefit in an
output market would be weighed against the harm in input markets. For exam-
ple, the DOJ might decline to challenge an airline merger that raised prices on a
few routes if it also lowered prices substantially on many other routes. Such an
approach finds some support in the Guidelines, which tolerate, as a matter of
prosecutorial discretion, a small harm in one market where it is inextricably
linked to larger benefits in second market.112 Tugging the other way is section 7
of the Clayton Act, which prohibits lost competition "in any line of com-
merce,"1 1 3 and substantial case law rejecting out-of-market benefits.1 1 4 Ifbalanc-
ing across markets is permitted, the relevant economic ondition would then be
that the net effect on purchasers and suppliers is positive. In other words, pur-
chasers benefit on balance (thanks to the pass-through), and that benefit is larger
than the loss in input markets.1 5
As we have explained, lower input prices can result either from efficiencies
or from conduct that suppresses competition in input markets. These alterna-
tives are not exhaustive: merging parties could gain a bargaining benefit that
does not neatly fit within either category. For example, in Anthem, one argued
source of savings was to force providers, under the "affiliate clause" of Anthem's
existing provider contracts, to provide service to Cigna customers at Anthem's
by the merged company would be passed through to the PBM's customers. Although retail
pharmacies might be concerned about this outcome, a reduction in dispensing fees following
the merger could benefit consumers by lowering health care costs." (footnote omitted)).
112. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § lo, at 3o n.14; see also Commentary on the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 75, at 58 (discussing the DOJ's decision not to chal-
lenge joint venture of bakeries where merger-specific efficiencies would benefit all customers,
despite possible adverse competitive effects for a subset of customers).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 18; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, § lo, at 30 & n.14
(indicating that agencies will normally challenge transaction if "likely to be anticompetitive in
any relevant market").
114. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
115. This approach was apparently taken by the United Kingdom Competition Commission in its
analysis of a merger between the Safeway and Morrisons grocery chains. See OECD Report,
supra note 13, at 63-64 (acknowledging harm to suppliers from weakened bargaining position,
but concluding that benefits to consumers, apparently including the financial benefits from a
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lower reimbursement rate.116 The Anthem court concluded that the claimed sav-
ings from use of the affiliate clause was not verifiable."' Setting the verifiability
issue aside, taking advantage of an existing contract provision in this manner
does not represent a true efficiency, but neither is it the result of suppressed ri-
valry, and hence the noncognizability argument discussed above does not ap-
ply."' If the court admits an efficiencies defense to an otherwise anticompetitive
merger, the merger should be permitted if and only if the savings fully counter-
acts the upward pricing pressure in output markets.
CONCLUSION
An anticompetitive merger of buyers can manifest harm in input markets by
increasing the merged firm's exercise of classical monopsony power, enabling it
to cut back on input purchases in order to suppress the price of the input; or by
increasing the merged firm's bargaining leverage by worsening the sellers' alter-
natives to an agreement, enabling the firm to force input price reductions or ex-
tract anticompetitive nonprice concessions from sellers. In some mergers, both
channels may be operative, as with a health insurance merger that increases both
monopsony power as to physicians and bargaining leverage against hospitals.
Neither theory of harm requires demonstration of adverse impact on output
markets, although such harms may be present too. Neither mechanism provides
a cognizable basis for an efficiency claim.
116. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The point here is not that the
combined entity would renegotiate any existing contracts, but that existing provider con-
tracts - for a period of time, until the contracts were subject to renewal - provided a basis un-
der the affiliate clause to lower the reimbursement level for existing Cigna customers.
117. As a Blue Cross/Blue Shield licensee, Anthem is required under so-called "best efforts" rules
to keep most of its business "Blue." Id. at 350. The rules limited Anthem's ability to exploit
affiliate clauses in this fashion, because if the Cigna customers stayed Cigna (rather than being
converted to Anthem's Blue product), the merged entity would fall out of compliance with
the best efforts obligation. The D.C. Circuit concluded that, as a consequence, the merged
entity would be unable to take advantage of affiliate clauses. Id. at 359-60.
118. By contrast, the district court took the position that efficiencies premised on "mere redistri-
bution" are never cognizable. See id. at 352, 355-56 (discussing the district court's view). As
discussed in the text, the key issue is not redistribution as such, but redistribution enabled by
reduced competition between buyers.
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